FakeSG enters the ‘FakeUpdates’ arena to deliver NetSupport RAT

Over 5 years ago, we began tracking a new campaign that we called FakeUpdates (also known as SocGholish) that used compromised websites to trick users into running a fake browser update. Instead, victims would end up infecting their computers with the NetSupport RAT, allowing threat actors to gain remote access and deliver additional payloads. As we have seen over the years, SocGholish is an established player that has managed to compromise countless victims and deliver ransomware after facilitating the installation of tools like Cobalt Strike or Mimikatz.

Now, there is a potential new competitor in the “fake updates” landscape that looks strangely familiar. The new campaign, which we call FakeSG, also relies on hacked WordPress websites to display a custom landing page mimicking the victim’s browser. The threat actors are distributing NetSupport RAT either as a zipped download or via an Internet shortcut. While FakeSG appears to be a newcomer, it uses different layers of obfuscation and delivery techniques that make it a threat to take seriously and which could potentially rival with SocGholish.  

Campaign similarities

We first heard of this new campaign thanks to a Mastodon post by Randy McEoin. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are very similar to those of SocGholish and it would be easy to think the two are related. In fact, this chain also leads to NetSupport RAT. However, the template source code is quite different and the payload delivery uses different infrastructure. As a result, we decided to call this variant FakeSG.

2023-07-19 Update: On June 5, @SecurityAura described an unknown campaign using .hta payloads disguised as driver updates. On June 22, @AnFam17 spotted the same fake browser update leveraging URL shortcuts. Both of these campaigns use a similar structure with compromised WordPress sites hosting the lure shortcuts and a WebDav server that loads NetSupport RAT. RussianPanda (@AnFam17) named the URL shortcut campaign RogueRaticate. Previous indicators of compromise have been added into the IOC section of this post.

Templates

FakeSG has different browser templates depending on which browser the victim is running. The themed “updates” look very professional and are more up to date than its SocGholish counterpart.

Website injections

Compromised websites (WordPress appears to be the top target) are injected with a code snippet that replaces the current webpage with the aforementioned fake updates templates. The source code is loaded from one of several domains impersonating Google (google-analytiks[.]com) or Adobe (updateadobeflash[.]website):

That code contains all the web elements (images, fonts, text) needed to render the fake browser update page. We should note that SocGholish used to retrieve media files from separate web requests until more recently when it started using self-contained Base64 encoded images.

Installation flow

There are different installation flows for this campaign, but we will focus on the one that uses a URL shortcut. The decoy installer (Install%20Updater%20(V104.25.151)-stable.url) is an Internet shortcut downloaded from another compromised WordPress site.

This heavily obfuscated script is responsible for the execution of PowerShell that downloads the final malware payload (NetSupport RAT).

Malwarebytes’s EDR shows the full attack chain (please click to enlarge):

The NetSupport RAT files are hosted on the same compromised WordPress site used earlier to download the Internet shortcut. The RAT’s main binary is launched from “C:Users%username%AppDataRoamingBranScaleclient32.exe“.

Following a successful infection, callbacks are made to the RAT’s command and control server at 94.158.247[.]27.

Roommates

Fake browser updates are a very common decoy used by malware authors. In addition to SocGholish, the Domen toolkit was a well-built framework that emerged in 2019 while another campaign known as sczriptzzbn dropped SolarMarker leading to the NetSupport RAT in both cases. Initial access brokers use tools like NetSupport RAT to gather information and perform additional actions on victims of interest. Stolen credentials can be resold to other threat actors tied to ransomware gangs.

It is interesting to see another contender in this relatively small space. While there is a very large number of vulnerable websites, we already see some that have been injected with multiple different malicious code. From a visitor’s point of view, this means there could be more than one redirect but the “winner” will be the one who is able to execute their malicious JavaScript code first.

We will continue to monitor these campaigns and in particular SocGholish to see if the web delivery landscape changes. Malwarebytes customers are protected as we detect the infrastructure and final payload used in these attacks.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

FakeSG infrastructure

178.159.37[.]73
google-analytiks[.]com
googletagmanagar[.]com
updateadobeflash[.]website

Internet shortcut

pietrangelo[.]it/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Install%20Updater%20(V104.25.151)-stable[.]url
ishahcouture[.]com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Install%20Updater%20(v102.22.145)[.]url
safetyofficer[.]pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Install%20Updater%20(V106.21.845)-stable(w).url

WebDav launcher

206[.]71[.]148[.]110
85[.]217[.]144[.]63
206[.]71[.]148[.]110/Downloads/launcher-upd[.]hta
85[.]217[.]144[.]63/Downloads/updater-install-brsw[.]hta
85[.]217[.]144[.]63/Downloads/installer-msi[.]hta
85[.]217[.]144[.]63/Downloads/msi-installupd[.]hta
85[.]217[.]144[.]63/Downloads/updater-install(win-macOs)[.]hta

NetSupport RAT

pietrangelo[.]it/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/BranScale[.]zip
pietrangelo[.]it/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/client32[.]exe
ishahcouture[.]com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ActiveGlucol[.]zip
renovationpro[.]us/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/b_brsw_installupd(msi-v542.00.17)[.]zip
sochilicious[.]com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/BRSW_installupd_win7-81_V205510_Win10_V2051500[.]zip
safetyofficer[.]pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/HomeTires.zip safetyofficer[.]pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/client32.exe

NetSupport RAT C2

94[.]158[.]247[.]27

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Tactic	ID	Name	Details
Execution	T1059	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Powershell used to download payload
	T1059.001	Powershell	Starts POWERSHELL.EXE for commands execution
	T1059.003	Windows Command Shell	Starts CMD.EXE for commands execution
Privilege escalation	T1548	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	Encoded PowerShell
	T1548.002	Bypass User Account Control
Defense evasion	T1564	Hide Artifacts	Encoded PowerShell
	T1218	System Binary Proxy Execution	Drops CMSTP.inf in %temp%
	T1027	Obfuscated Files or Information	Drops th5epzxc.cmdline in %temp%
	T1112	Modify Registry	Adds key to registry: HKEY_CLASSES_ROOTCLSID{645FF040-5081-101B-9F08-00AA002F954E}shellopencommand /f /ve /t REG_SZ /d C:UsersadminAppDataRoamingBranScaleclient32.exe
	T1548	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Encoded PowerShell
Discovery	T1082	System Information Discovery	Gets computer name
C&C	T1071	Application Layer Protocol	NetSupport RAT C2 communication
	T1571	Non-Standard Port	Port destination: 5051